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This paper attempts to interpret the interrelated dimensions of learning between technological 
professions (technicians, engineers, researchers) and the dynamic process of innovation on the basis 
of a international comparative analysis. One of main hypothesis is that scientific and technological 
professions, far from constituting a universal and homogeneous category, are "social constructs" 
which embody a specific mode of knowledge creation in Japan and France and thus tend to structure 
national patterns of innovation. On the basis of our Franco-Japanese comparative research (three 
couples of firms in the chemical, the electric/electronic and software service sectors), we focus our 
analysis on some facts in the construction of the engineer category which offer sharp contrasts from 
one country to another: a clear difference in the way engineers in France and in Japan are certified by 
higher education systems; a difference in the way their career patterns (mobility, training, incentive 
system) are organised. The nature of innovative capacity seems finally to be closely linked to the way 
that the career patterns of engineers/scientists are managed, at both the national and the firm level, in 
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Introduction 
 
The effectiveness of learning economies is clearly linked to their efficient 
coordination of individual and collective learning processes, and also to their capacity for 
rapidly transforming new ideas into a product, a production process or an organisation. 
Engineers/scientists naturally find themselves right in the centre of such activity. It is 
therefore vital to analyse the interdependence between the way these professionals are 
"socialised" in societal (national) contexts, the nature of the knowledge they generate and the 
form their technical creativity takes. 
Our main hypothesis is that scientific and technological professions, far from 
constituting a universal and homogeneous category, are "social constructs" which embody a 
specific mode of knowledge creation in each country and thus tend to structure national 
patterns of innovation. The societal approach adopted here places great emphasis on the 
interdependence between the nature of the actors and the societal (and national) "space" 
within which they are shaped: engineers/scientists are considered as actors who, at the same 
time, are generated by and determine the national configuration of an innovation system, 
which is itself made up of various institutions such as the higher education system, the 
training system, firms, public research laboratories and so on. In other words, while an 
innovation system is obviously structured by the interaction between these institutions, the 
engineers/scientists play the main role in their linkage and mutual commitment through their 
own interaction. Indeed, from the epistemological point of view, learning or knowledge 
creation through interaction essentially occurs on an individual rather than institutional basis. 
The analytical bridge between the individual and institutional levels can be made only by the 
introduction of the concept of actors. 
This societal approach seems very close to some institutionalist schools of thought in 
the Economics of Innovation, in particular evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter 1982), 
which, based on the concept of "routine", emphasises the relative coherence of the "national 
system of innovation" (Freeman 1987, Lundvall 1992, Edquist 1997) in a country and its 
specific trajectory along its historical time path. All these schools stress the importance of the 
tacit dimension of knowledge, as pointed out some time ago by insightful economists such as 
Hayek, Polanyi and others, who gave prominence to the process of knowledge creation 
embedded in the routines of economic activities. In this case, knowledge is considered in the 
context of the institutional arrangements within which it is contained. Since it is shaped by a 
set of shared habits, routines, established practices and representations, knowledge is 
considered to be more or less local or idiosyncratic in nature. For this reason, the circulation 
of knowledge requires individuals to be in reasonably close proximity to each other and to 
have shared norms, conventions and, more generally, "mental models". Thus, some authors 
speak of the "social shaping of knowledge" (Williams and Edge 1992) or even of the 
"institutional nature of knowledge" (Foray 1994). Although the writings of these schools 
show great analytical quality and rich scientific interest, it is somewhat difficult to locate the 
micro-foundation of learning or knowledge creation in such institutional analyses, which are 
conducted principally at the macro level. This is why it is of great importance to understand 
the way that various institutions concretely build mutual commitments and the way that 
individuals learn by interacting with each other at the micro level, so as to stimulate 
innovation.  
The originality of our approach lies in introducing the notion of an actor, which 
permits us at once to develop a more comprehensive analysis on the basis of empirical 
research and to interpret the interrelated dimensions of learning between actors and the 
dynamic process of innovation. Our basic assumption is that the creation of knowledge results 
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as much from the investment (Becker 1962) or the "translation" via socio-technical 
networking (Callon 1989) as from the construction, through socialisation and learning, of the 
actor in whom the knowledge is embodied. 
In this paper, the theoretical and methodological aspects of our approach will not be 
fully discussedi. On the basis of our Franco-Japanese comparative research, we shall focus 
our analysis on some stylised facts in the construction of the engineer category which offer 
sharp contrasts from one country to another.ii We shall first attempt to show a clear difference 
in the way engineers in France and in Japan are certified or produced by higher education 
systems. Second, we propose to link the national mode of socialisation not only with their 
career patterns but also with the nature of the innovation which they tend to promote. 
 
I. Socialisation through education and training systems 
 
I.1. Statistical Comparison of "Engineers" 
In France, the category of "engineer" is ambiguous and heterogeneous, since this title 
is used for both an educational qualification and a post. Thus, not all qualified engineers hold 
engineering jobs, and conversely, not all those who are in engineering have an engineer's 
qualification, attested by the State diploma, after five years of schooling in the "Grandes 
Ecoles" (selective engineering schools). In Japan, the category of guijutsusha is even broader 
than that of "engineer" in France. It is associated neither with a specific type of qualification 
nor with a professional status. The national census defines this category as "those who have 
received scientific or technical training, generally in the higher education system such as 
universities, or those having an equivalent level with respect to capabilities and professional 
experience. . . ." Such a definition encompasses scientists, engineers and technicians in the 
French sense and thus corresponds more closely to the French definition of "corporate R&D 
staff (ingénieurs et cadres techniques)". These differences in the statistical or status-based 
definition make the quantitative comparison of engineers very delicate. If, in spite of possible 
statistical bias, we compare the stock of "engineers" defined as such by the national censuses, 
we obtain the percentages of "engineers" in the working population, which are respectively 
2.9 % (659,000 persons in 1997) in France and 3.7% (2,370,000 persons in 1995) in Japan: 
the larger proportion of Japanese engineers is not surprising, since it may also include part of 
the “technician” category in the French sense.  
As far as the comparison of the annual flow of young qualified graduates in the 
science and engineering disciplines is concerned, the quantitative production of young 
"engineers/scientists" is very similar in the two countries. Both Japan and France make an 
effort to develop technical and scientific human potential through the higher education 
system: young graduates with more than four years of higher education represent 1.99 per 
thousand of the working population (128,000 first-level university degrees) in Japan and 1.90 
(43,000) in France. But most significantly, the latter puts a strong priority on the production 
of engineers/scientists with a long initial training period (more than five years after the high 
school baccalauréat) particularly through the "Grandes Ecoles". This French situation 
                                                 
i
 For the theoretical and methodological discussions on the "societal" approach, see M. Maurice, J.-J. Silvestre 
and F. Sellier (1986),The Social Foundations of Industrial Power : A Comparison of France and 
Germany.(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.) 
ii
 See our research reports on the comparative study of Japan and France: "Engineers, Organizations and 
Innovation: Training Systems and Organization of Technical Skills in Japanese and French Firms" LEST and JIL 
(Japan Institute of Labour), 1995. The most recent report concerns the software industry : “A Comparative Study 
of the Software Industries in Japan and France”, LEST and Gakushuin University, 1998. See the Annex for the 
details of companies surveyed. 
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contrasts with the Japanese one, where a four-year period of university training (bachelor's 
degree) remains predominant, although there has been a rapid increase of students in masters 
programmes (six years of training) in the most renowned universities. Similarly, there is a 
considerable difference between the number of scientific doctoral theses produced annually: 
0.28 doctors per thousand of the working population (6,387 PhDs) in France for 1995, but 
only 0.08 (5,152 PhDs) in Japan.iii  
These indicators show that France invests heavily, and with considerable cost, in high-
potential human capital, while Japan seems to opt for the mass production of fairly 
undifferentiated engineers/scientists. 
 
I.2. Educational and Training Systems in France and in Japan 
In France, higher education offers various routes to qualification. There are both 
engineering schools ("Grandes Ecoles") and university science faculties. The former adopt a 
system of entrance examinations (numerus clausus) and screen students mainly by numbers, 
while the latter accept all the students holding the baccalauréat but apply a progressive 
selection process through annual examinations. Each institution is designed to "rank" and 
train a particular category of students. Thus, university graduates traditionally enter either the 
public and private sector as research workers, whereas engineers from the most famous 
engineering schools tend to embark quickly on careers as State technocrats (corps d'Etat) or 
in higher management in the private sector. The rationale behind training and qualification 
opportunities corresponds to a French way of management characterised by marked 
differences of status among employees. Furthermore, a very fine distinction must be made 
between engineers who have graduated from engineering schools with various technical 
specialities (software, robotics, aeronautics etc.) and those graduating from university with a 
more academic background. Those obtaining a diploma with only 2, 3 or 4 years in higher 
education will not automatically be given the "title" of engineer at the beginning of their 
career: they correspond to the "senior technician” category, which has a status inferior to that 
of engineer. The logic behind this distinction is based on the strength of the educational frame 
of reference and leads to separate professional identities, which in turn serve to legitimise 
hierarchically ordered functions or "territories" within the firm. 
In Japan, by contrast, higher education maintains the character of mass education with 
a relative homogeneity of academic programs. The university system therefore stresses a very 
general and broad-based curriculum rather than professional or scientific specialisation.iv In 
this sense, the labour supply is not very differentiated. On the other hand, this educational 
system is characterised by a hierarchical order of establishments. Such a hierarchy works as a 
filter for ranking the students on the basis of their potential. The way that graduates from 
different universities are distributed in the labour market depends on a matching mechanism 
between the rank of each university in this hierarchy and the reputation of each firm, rather 
than on individual signalling (academic speciality, particular expertise etc.). Moreover, 
compared with the French situation, the Japanese one involves a continuum from one 
university level to another, without any radical breaks between them. Three-quarters of the 
graduates in scientific or engineering fields spend four years in higher education. Their 
qualification level therefore constitutes a clear reference point for the whole engineer 
category. Length of time spent in higher education with the reference to this dominant period 
                                                 
iii
 In the case of Japan, half of the PhDs are accorded to corporate scientists actively involved in industry. The 
figure does not include the hundreds of Japanese students  who obtain  their PhDs in the US each year.   
iv
 This situation is somewhat paradoxical, because Japanese scientific training has historically been dominated by 
the engineering faculty. The engineering faculties enrol 461,000 students and the natural science faculties only 
73,000 (1992 figures). Engineering training in Japan does not give much importance to student specialisation. 
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and seniority in the company have equal weight; a six-year training period, for example, 
represents an extra two years as far as seniority is concerned. Such assimilation means that 
the management of all university qualifications by year of entrance into the firm is both 
homogeneous and compatible with competitive career advancement. Nonetheless, if 
qualifications are accepted as equivalent at the beginning of professional career in Japan, the 
effects of the university hierarchy remain. They reveal themselves only gradually during the 
graduate's career, in contrast with the almost immediate effect of the hierarchy of the French 
"Grandes Ecoles". 
 
I.3. Transition Between the Educational System and the Labour Market 
Another particularity of the French training system is the existence of the engineer 
"status". Indeed, in France, an engineer's status is clearly defined by his or her "title" and the 
fact of belonging to the category of cadre (this French concept includes not only management 
but also highly qualified professionals). French legislation makes a clear distinction between 
engineers who graduate from State-accredited schools and "in-house" engineers who are 
promoted within a single firm. This "title" of engineer attests to both general and technical 
knowledge and gives them social legitimacy and professional autonomy alike.  
On the contrary, there is no formal recognition of the title of either engineer or 
scientist in Japan as a prerequisite for entering a firm. Such recognition is built up gradually 
from the time that the young university graduate is recruited. The form of recruitment 
involves a collective type of contracting which ties young graduates to the firm. They are all 
subject to the same procedure and enter employment at the same time. They automatically 
accept this collective commitment without negotiating individual conditions, while French 
engineers individually negotiate the conditions of their contracts and professional 
commitments with the firm. The latter are chosen by the employer on the basis of both the 
school from which they graduated and their specialisation. The former are not recruited 
because of their particular skills but because of their potential, measured roughly by the level 
and the reputation of their universities.v Both parties commit themselves to a strict 
relationship involving mutual obligations. The firm invests in training, taking its chance on 
the graduate's long-term potential. As for the graduates, they agree to learn the art of 
engineering and wait for deferred recognition in terms of wages and promotion to a 
management position. Such a tacit contract on the basis of mutual commitment shapes a 
particular form of internal labour market in Japan and structures the learning behaviour of 
Japanese engineers which constitutes the base of firm's capability.  
 
II.- Construction of R&D Staff's Capacity: Division of Labour, Hierarchy and 
Career Patterns  
 
Innovative capacity depends on the way that the career patterns of engineers/scientists 
are managed--at both the national and the firm level--in order to create the linkage between 
individual leaning and the collective accumulation of knowledge. The organisation of career 
patterns is, nevertheless, very closely associated with the structure of the labour market, the 
social division of labour and the hierarchy in the firm. In other words, the learning attitude of 
engineers/scientists and the way that they coordinate with each other and create shared 
knowledge are dependent on the form of incentive system within which they are integrated 
                                                 
v
 The introduction of students to the company by the university professor plays a very important role as a first job 
search channel, because the mechanism of individual signalling does not work well in the Japanese labour 
market. This channel of communication constitutes a major link organising relations between university and 
industry in the case of Japan. 
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(Aoki 1988). In this regard, France and Japan show different institutional frameworks (see 
figure I). In particular, the French firm, through interactions with the educational system, 
elaborates a very specific form of combination between incentive and coordination 
mechanisms which cannot be assimilated to the typology developed by Aoki.vi 
The models presented here correspond to an “ideal-type” in the Weberian sense which 
has been established by gathering the most significant stylised facts collected in our case 
studies. As a result, they do not reflect local variations which might exist according to the 
sector or size of firms. We assume, however, that the different aspects put together in a model 
make a meaningful system of coherence which helps us to understand the complex reality. 
  
 
Figure I.  Comparison of Hierarchies in Japan and France 
 
 
II.1. Access to the Hierarchy: Skill Stratification and Learning 
The hierarchy in French firms is based essentially on the job-classification system--the 
key factor in both the technical management of production and the social management of 
labour--to which employees gain access through a variety of routes and strategies. In other 
words, the hierarchy is sustained by both external and internal mobility. Thus, at all levels of 
the hierarchy, including the highest ones, both employees holding the formal qualifications 
stipulated for that particular level and self-taught individuals promoted from the lower levels 
coexist. It is as if these two categories of actors were constantly competing with each other for 
vacant jobs by enhancing their human capital in their own particular ways. 
 
These two modes of access to the hierarchy naturally have their own internal logics: 
                                                 
vi
 Based on a theoretical comparison of the A-type firm (American) and the J-type firm (Japanese), his approach 
is very stimulating and coherent as a theory of the firm, but it appears mechanical from an empirical standpoint. 
Our interpretation is based on the premise that the firms are deeply embedded in the social structure (incentive 
and coordination mechanisms), which would explain the national diversity of firm organizations and the way that 
these evolve. This position is much more in line with the evolutionary theory. 
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The match between formal qualifications and jobs is based on the collective agreement 
negotiated between the social partners and legitimated by the State. These rules are external 
givens to which French firms have to acquiesce. At the same time, the educational system 
selects students for its various levels and courses, thereby preparing them for specific 
occupational categories: those with five years of higher education are graduate engineers (or 
cadres), those with two years of higher or further education are technicians, those with the 
vocational baccalauréat or CAP are manual workers, and so on. This labour supply, which is 
already extremely hierarchical, is also finely ranked and highly specialised, as mentioned 
above: science graduates from the universities are often destined to become researchers, 
engineers from the major "Grandes Ecoles" to be senior managers or executives, engineers 
from the minor "Grandes Ecoles" to work in R&D functions, and holders of lower-level 
qualifications (the two-year university curriculum) to be senior technicians. This evaluation of 
individuals, carried out on the basis of educational selection, extends directly into the 
hierarchy and remains very much in evidence throughout an employee’s entire career. The 
importance attached to educational qualifications gives rise to various occupational identities 
that are used to legitimate both the existence of hierarchically arranged “territories” and the 
strategy of external mobility in the labour market. This segmentation gives rise to a certain 
imbalance of power in the organisation of creativity in manufacturing industry: those engaged 
directly in manufacturing (i.e., technicians and manual workers) are rarely allowed to play as 
large a role as possible in the technical aspects of product design and manufacturing, since 
R&D staff tends to “parachute” their ideas onto the shop floor with little consultation. In other 
words, the existence of hierarchical "territories" hinders the development of wide-ranging 
dialogue between the R&D, design and manufacturing functions as well as that of sufficiently 
rigorous compromises between technical “inventiveness” and manufacturing feasibility. 
"Graduate engineers design a new product . . . and they have never mixed with 
production workers, they cannot imagine how the product they design is going to be 
manufactured . . ." (head of production). 
 
"People in the R&D department are so concerned with the basic product functions that 
they attach greater importance to the concept design than to subsidiary details. . . . Thus they 
seek to solve these fundamental aspects without worrying about the manufacturing problems 
that this may pose during the industrialization process. . . . The technicians in charge of 
industrialization often have to say that the device is not completely finished, although the 
engineers say it is. . . . It turns into a dialogue of the deaf. . . (industrialization manager). 
 
Faithful to the doctrine of scientific management, France tends to produce a hierarchy 
characterised by both a separation between science and technology and a clear split between 
design (thinking) and production (manufacturing). The former function is overvalued, while 
the latter is not given sufficient consideration. 
Over and above the influence on organisational structures exerted by educational 
qualifications, firms also have some leeway to take the initiative in constructing their 
hierarchy. In so doing, they are explicitly recognising the allegiance that employees without 
formal qualifications develop through the stabilisation of their position within the firm. This 
interaction between firm and employees is based on highly personal strategies. The ambition 
of technicians is clearly to be promoted to the engineer or cadre category. This system of 
internal promotion serves as an incentive mechanism for those wishing to become involved in 
their work or to invest in continuing training. The mechanism thus creates groups of self-
taught employees, such as the so-called “in-house” technicians or engineers, who coexist with 
their formally qualified colleagues: according to a French survey (Ministry of Research and 
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Technology 1998), 10 % of researchers in the industrial corporate laboratories have PhDs and 
15 % are considered “self-taught” researchers, while the majority of them (58%) are 
engineering graduates. 
To sum up, the French engineering graduates gain access to a firm with recognised 
skills and a "title" of engineer. In this way, they may be considered a "quasi-finished product" 
having a generic technical expertise, although they naturally have to be initiated into the 
particular codes--formal and unwritten--of engineering functions (rules of design, procedures 
of programming, scheduling etc.). They learn such technical matters on the job. However, this 
professional initiation does not last very long. Their entry into the first job is accompanied by 
an adaptation of their skill to the working environment but not by an "apprenticeship" in the 
Japanese sense. 
"Someone who starts straight out of engineering school will be considered an 
apprentice for three or six months. . . . They learn on the job in the technical service. . . . 
Confronted with the concrete approach to daily problems, they can observe what happens on 
the technical side and learn how to supervise technicians and their work. . . " (head of 
technical service). 
 
Thus, they integrate a pre-established division of skills characterised by a "Taylorist" 
principle of separation between design and manufacturing: the engineer's task is conceptual in 
nature as opposed to the technician's, which consists of resolving empirical problems. We can 
cite many examples showing a clear-cut division of labour between engineers and technicians 
throughout the firm: at laboratory level, at manufacturing level and in a project team.vii 
“The only authority is an authority of competence in the laboratory. Those people 
have technician training, they can only solve problems at a technical level. As soon as a 
scientific reflection is required, they cannot. . . . For my part, I bring new ideas based on 
scientific fact . . ." (R&D engineer). 
 
 
“The engineer is, in his function, a sort of expert-system which generates algorithms, 
whereas the technician applies these algorithms to concrete technical problems. . . ” 
(executive).  
 
Thus, from the very beginning of their career, the superiority of intellectual work 
leads the engineers/scientists to fulfil control functions which make them take initiatives and 
identify themselves as managers. Indeed, young French engineers/scientists frequently take 
responsibility at an earlier stage of their career, although they are not sufficiently prepared. 
The following remark made by a young project leader is revealing: 
 
“The fundamental part of an engineer’s work, that is, all aspects of the organisation 
and management of people, isn’t taught in engineering school. . ." (young project leader). 
 
But they are not faced with the problem of gaps between the management function 
and the technical or scientific function, as is frequently reported in a case study of English 
                                                 
vii
 According to the French survey of employment in 1997 (Enquête Emploi, Insee), the category of engineers and 
technical managers includes 292,000 persons and that of technicians 408,000 in industry. As far as the former is 
concerned, 44 % are engineering-school graduates, 11 % engineers graduated from universities, and the others 
considered "in-house" engineers. Within the technician category, one-third have a diploma superior to two-year 
training in higher education, and another  third have vocational training certificates. 
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industry (Lam 1998). The engineers' role in French organisation naturally integrates these two 
functions.  
"Engineers are multi-skilled. They must be able to speak the language of technology, 
marketing and management, and to manage a budget. This is not required either of 
technicians or of commercial managers who are not engineers" (head of technical service).  
 
Contrary to France, where the engineering graduates enter managerial positions 
directly, Japanese engineers/scientists integrate a rank-and-file position.viii Whether they have 
received two, four or six or more years of higher education, university graduates constitute a 
more or less undifferentiated population of recruits from which, after a period of between ten 
and fifteen years, the new generation of senior managers or expert professionals will be 
selected. In other words, the entire population of new recruits is treated, formally at least, as a 
single reservoir of human resources from which specific resources are gradually extracted. 
Thus, the process of differentiation takes place over time and is based more on where the new 
recruits are allocated and what they learn than on the status or category to which they belong 
at the beginning of their careers.  
Moreover, the “technician” category has neither a place in the classification system 
nor any real equivalent in Japan. This is why the technician category is not included for Japan 
in figure I above. The tasks performed by "technicians" in France seem to be allocated to 
experienced manual workers at the end of their careers and to supervisors, as well as to 
university graduates with six years of higher training at the beginning of their careers. This 
breaking-up of the technicians’ role may well explain why the boundary between thinking 
(design) and doing (manufacturing) or the limit between laboratory and factory in the 
Japanese hierarchy is somewhat ill defined. The separation of tasks that is one of the guiding 
principles of Taylorism is certainly not eliminated, but it is attenuated to a certain extent, if 
not modified radically. 
 "I have been involved, for a few years, with the technical transfer of IC chip 
manufacturing between Japan and France. I think the French engineers are very conceptual, I 
mean that they are mainly preoccupied with the conceptual framework and much less 
interested in technical details. . . . I'm actually a research engineer but I've often had to solve 
very concrete manufacturing problems in the product development process. So I was obliged 
to initiate myself, for example, to the micro welding operation. Such know-how, which I used 
to acquire on the production-site, was very useful. When the French engineers couldn't solve 
the problems of welding on paper, I could, by operating the equipment, show the technicians 
how we could determine the operational solutions. . . . They [French engineers] said it was 
not a good engineering solution, the technicians couldn't solve it scientifically, but the most 
important thing is that we can produce the chips correctly with the machines" (Japanese head 
of IC promotion section).  
 
". . . The most important thing for process engineers is to have real experience with 
operations. If they've learned to operate themselves, they are really capable of decoding the 
manufacturing language of operators. The most experienced operators can often identify a 
serious problem by experience. . . . The role of engineers is solely to formalise the operational 
skills. . ." (head of production). 
 
                                                 
viii
 The starting wage of young Japanese graduates is very  close to that of production workers of the same age, 
while the French graduate engineers start their salary career at a level which is twice that of manual workers and 
equal to that of the highest paid technicians. See H. Nohara (1995), "La comparaison France-Japon des salaires" 
Travail et Emploi  no. 62,. 
 - 10 -   
For each graduate, the initial period of work is used to become an engineer through 
on-the-job training. Not having any immediately useful skills, all these new recruits undergo 
the same type of occupational and organisational apprenticeship. It is a common process for 
all young engineers, although they tend to be dispatched to different functions according to 
the level of university training: those with masters degrees to R&D functions, those with 
bachelors degree to development and design functions, those having two-year university 
training to design and manufacturing functions and so on. 
 
"In this laboratory, all young graduates, independent of their degree level, have the 
status of "apprentice" for two years. During this period, each one, although integrated in a 
research team, is given his [or her] particular study topic and works on it. At the end, they 
present the result before a jury composed of senior researchers. Depending on the outcome of 
this evaluation, their assignment to a post becomes definite. Some of them remain in the 
laboratory, the others go to the design section or the development centre and so on" (young 
scientist).  
 
" I was introduced to this company by my professor, with whom I had done a master's 
course. I studied chemical engineering and vaguely thought I would become a process 
engineer. But I have been allocated to the lab and assigned to C- mos IC research. . . . It was a 
new technology both for the company and for me. I knew nothing about it. . . . I had to start 
from zero and learn with my senior colleague, a person who had some experience in this area. 
I never worked so hard in my life as during the first four years. . . . I used to do from 100 to 
150 hours of overtime a month. . ." (senior researcher in the central laboratory). 
 
Their skills develop during a long process of socialisation: the new recruits begin by 
exploring technically limited tasks with little responsibility and gradually extend their sphere 
of competence by moving on to related tasks. Given the quasi-absence of the technician 
category in Japanese organisation, all young graduates are assigned to concrete technical tasks 
to resolve problems or develop minor applications under the control of senior 
engineers/scientists and in cooperation with different categories of workers. Such 
collaboration or cooperation seems to be largely facilitated by the fact that the boundaries 
between tasks or jobs are rather ambiguous in Japanese organisation, contrary to the French 
engineers who tend to build their own "territories". The porosity of task organisation and the 
ill-defined responsibility of each member generate multiple interactions, mutual adjustment 
and a certain flexibility vis-à-vis environmental changes (Ishida 1986). Such auto-
organisation centred on the local adjustments is a source of information redundancy which 
can be seen as organisational inefficiency. It favours the sharing of information and 
knowledge, however. This way of learning, orientated toward empirical problem-solving, 
contributes to developing tacit knowledge and sharing it collectively.  
 
"In our company, there are many formal training programs for the young graduates. 
But these programs are not what makes the engineer. The young engineers are initiated to the 
work on the job (genba-shugi). . . . We generally try to arrange things so that there are entry-
level jobs in which they can experience the concrete approaches to detailed designs of 
equipment or technical experiments. They are guided by the section head, but more frequently 
backed up by the senior colleagues in the team. . . . When they made a stupid error on the 
blueprint, I told them to go and listen to the operators in the workplace. . . . In any case, they 
learn informal or unwritten technical knowledge through a sort of osmosis with their working 
environment. . ." (head of design section). 
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Nevertheless, these tasks become more complex and comprise more managerial 
functions in the course of professional advancement. This kind of organisation-driven 
learning puts the young employees in a situation of dependence and long-term competition 
with colleagues in the same entry group. Such a slow rate of progression does not encourage 
initiative and may weaken the originality of the individuals, or even drain their creativity. But 
this kind of "apprenticeship", as in Germany, forces employees to learn how to work together 
and to maintain the idea of overall performance. 
 
II.2. Incentive Mechanisms, Selection and Career Patterns of Engineers  
In the constitution of a "typical" career pattern, the external labour market is of little 
importance to Japanese engineers/scientists. Some comparative studies (Ishii 1993, Shapira 
1995), as well as our own, indicate that they experience much less external mobility than do 
European or American engineers. Most of them continue their careers within the same firm or 
industrial group. Their internal mobility, which seems to be closely controlled by the 
supervisors and the firm, implies a kind of chain-linked movement between tasks or jobs 
which share some technical proximity.  
 
" . . . Half of the research people will have leave the lab in their mid-thirties and only 
some 20 percent will remain there after the age of forty . . . . These researchers experience 
transfer to the lab, the design section or the factory, very often accompanying the development 
of new products as a group. . . . Their main mobility is from upstream to downstream" 
(assistant-director of a research laboratory). 
 
From the organisational point of view, such mobility has two effects: it tends, on the 
one hand, to build a hybrid but highly consistent competence focused on managing the various 
interfaces and, on the other, to facilitate the diffusion of tacit knowledge. During the first half 
of their careers, Japanese engineers are constantly placed in a learning position where they 
contribute to the collective development of knowledge by enlarging their own technical 
competence. At the same time, they gradually acquire the coordination capacity required to 
assume greater responsibility. Contrary to the French engineers, who have a rational 
coordination capacity, they develop a highly contextual and idiosyncratic competence which 
combines technical, relational and managerial know-how. Indeed, given such mobility chains 
among different jobs, Japanese engineers/scientists are more likely to have varied work 
experience that covers a wide range of technical areas and to share such experience with 
others. This situation helps the engineers to overcome communication barriers and transfer 
tacit as well as explicit knowledge based on their shared experience. In this sense, the mobility 
among closely related tasks that they experience at the initial stage of their careers contributes 
to developing an important organisational ability to improve cross-functional integration.  
The hierarchy of educational levels and university degrees remains in suspension 
during this period of apprenticeship. However, its effects make themselves felt as individuals 
advance along their career paths, and particularly in terms of promotion within the hierarchy. 
Indeed, although the majority of university graduates advance at more or less similar rates for 
almost ten years, the principle of selection and competition gradually begins to emerge. The 
pivotal period falls between 35 and 40 years of age, when the selection for the first rung of the 
management ladder takes place. This selection is based not on a shot in the dark or a gamble 
on any particular individual but rather, on the system of assessment that constantly evaluates, 
on an annual basis, not only each individual’s output but also his or her progress in the 
learning process and ability to cooperate and contribute to the collective effort (Koike and 
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Inoki 1987). This system encourages employees to incorporate long-term considerations into 
their career strategies. Nevertheless, sustained and exacting competition of this kind finishes 
by producing a hierarchy within the 35-40 age group--which leads to the separation of 
university graduates into managers and non-managers--and continues in an extremely 
selective way as employees progress towards the upper echelons of the hierarchy. Such 
structuring of internal career paths ultimately corresponds to the principle of “tournament 
competition” outlined by Rosenbom (1982). The question that remains, however, is why and 
how Japanese firms manage to organise such a slow selection process combining cooperation, 
collective learning and individual competition, which are largely contradictory elements from 
the European point of view. 
Compared to the Japanese situation, individual strategies play a major role in the 
career patterns of French engineers. There exist, as we have seen, two categories of engineers. 
One is composed of "in-house" engineers promoted from the technician category, who 
cultivate allegiance to the firm. Like their Japanese counterparts, they develop a contextual 
skill, but their empirical know-how, considered inferior to conceptual expertise, is 
undervalued. Their career paths tend to be limited to low-level technical functions, R&D 
support or production management in the firm. 
 
“ There is a cultural demarcation between engineers and technicians . . . which creates 
an identity problem for those who cross the barrier. . . . In any case, technicians do not have 
access to posts of high responsibility, even when [they have] the title of cadre . . .” 
(technician passing the test for access to management cadre status). 
 
French engineering-school graduates wield a certain bargaining power on the basis of 
their technical expertise and nationally recognised "title". At every stage of their careers, they 
negotiate the conditions of their contracts (remuneration, working conditions, etc.) and their 
professional commitment to the firm. The resulting contract appears explicit and limited in 
content and in time compared to the Japanese one, which is more implicit or ambiguous. In 
any case, the firm rapidly puts these engineers to the test and channels them into different 
careers. Thus, the most competent engineers/scientists are quickly selected, assigned to the 
management of an important project or promoted to a strategic position.  
 
“. . . There’s a natural tendency to be elitist, and at a very early stage we tend to 
consider natural talents rather than those that have been cultivated. What emerges naturally is 
more important than what is built up gradually. With the young ones, we very quickly identify 
the talented ones and put them on a fast track to the hierarchy. And we don’t often check on 
the knowledge they’re accumulating. We often take risks . . . ” (Technical Department head). 
 
Although the firm develops interesting career paths in the internal labour market for 
these engineers/scientists, it always faces the risk of their departure, which represents a loss 
of technical expertise and organisational knowledge. The mobility of these 
engineers/scientists both internally and externally seems to be motivated essentially by 
individual strategic choices, whereas in Japan, the internal transfer of engineers/scientists is 
closely controlled by the organisation. Moreover, internal mobility occurs more frequently 
and covers a larger range of functions among French engineers/scientists than among their 
Japanese counterparts. It corresponds to a progression between functions which are organised 
according to a notion of "territory". Such a territorial rationale leads to a segmentation of 
organisation (research, marketing, production etc.), but also to the difficulty of coordination 
between them and the relatively limited amount of collective learning. This kind of internal 
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mobility reflects the engineer's ability to fulfil different functions, master them and adapt to 
them. In France, therefore, engineers' career paths appear discontinuous, with breaks between 
various types of technical or managerial responsibilities. 
 
“The most brilliant career consists of going from one product department to another or 
shifting from the production function to marketing, strategic planning, purchasing and so on 
every three years. If you have such a profile, you're guaranteed to go straight to an executive 
post . . . ” (Product Department head). 
 
II.3. Work Patterns, Coordination and Innovation Process 
Incentive mechanisms and career formation are interrelated not only with work 
organisation for engineers/scientists, but also with the way the innovation process is 
conducted. We can thus observe contrasting forms of information flow and coordination 
associated with the different career patterns in the two countries.  
French organisation is characterised by more bureaucratic control, which produces 
formal project management and numerous management tools accompanying the project. 
Coordination between project members is basically maintained by formal procedures and 
explicit rules; information and technical specifications are also more explicitly expressed and 
recorded in written documents for reducing "territorial" conflicts and transferring the 
knowledge in a "sequential" manner from one step to another within a project. The flow of 
information is a vertical one which goes from top to bottom, or from upstream to downstream. 
This does not, however, imply a simple linear model where no learning occurs in the process 
of innovation. In terms of the chain-linked model proposed by Kline and Rosenberg (1986), 
the French approach is closer to long-loop feedback, which generates a formal database and 
enriches the architectural competence at the top of the organisation.  
 
" Project management is rather linear in this company. . . . It is essential to pass as 
directly as possible from one phase of product development to the next. Once a phase has 
come to an end, the file, designs, written documents must be complete and ready to pass to the 
next. . . . There should be no need to go back to a previous phase. . . . This means that the 
various phases must not overlap . . ." (project leader). 
 
In certain sectors faced with the economics of variety, implying the necessity of 
flexible adjustments at the most decentralised level of organisation, this mode of coordination 
seems to be less efficient, because it is very difficult to introduce retroactive and corrective 
actions. But it has proven its effectiveness in organising major scientific programmes such as 
the national nuclear project, the aerospace programme or complex technological projects 
which require considerable information processing and a massive coordination capacity. The 
competences of French engineers, and especially those of the engineering elite, correspond to 
the organisational requisites of a hierarchy-based on vertical coordination.  
The Japanese organisational approach seems quite different: coordination is less based 
on the formal procedure, although the PERT method is often applied to project management. 
Despite the development of automatic artefacts (CAD/CAM systems), knowledge sharing is 
more dependent on intensive human interaction and mutual understanding. Project 
management tends to be organised through reciprocal and “horizontal” communication and 
mutual adjustment between members (Aoki 1986). It depends less heavily on formal planning 
and hierarchical control but requires team members' cohesion within the project. The role of 
the project manager is, as in the French case, to meet the deadline and attain the product-
quality level fixed at the beginning of the project. He or she attempts to fulfil these ends, not 
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by imposing a formal procedure and rigorous work schedule but by encouraging continuous 
mutual adjustment throughout the problem-solving process. Contrary to the French “rational” 
approach, the Japanese one might be qualified as “holistic”, insofar as it leads all members to 
participate in a common experience and to share not only formalised knowledge but also a 
vast stock of non-coded knowledge. This “holistic” mode contributes to enriching a collective 
capacity for problem-solving at the local level, but it does not always succeed in formalising 
the experience at the general level.  
 
 "Phases are not always very clear-cut in our project, although we must pass the project 
review at each step. . .  I think these reviews cannot completely check all the technical 
problems which appear later. The process is much more erratic and non-linear. For example, 
we must continue to work out some functional details while the product is being tested. It is 
normal that we, that all development engineers, have to go to the factory in order to find 
practical solutions for a technical defect, modify the specifications, even few days before the 
product's date of commercialisation. . . . You know, it's very often anarchic at the final stage 
of a project. . . . Each member adjusts to the others in a chaotic way under the pressure of the 
deadline. . . . For each project, it's always the same thing. We repeat it but we consume lot of 
energy. . ." (project manager).  
 
This form of coordination clearly privileges what is characterised as a short-loop 
feedback in the chain-linked model, which insists on the central role of feedback of 
information or new knowledge between a set of linked activities in innovation (R&D, design, 
trial, manufacturing, marketing etc.). The Japanese approach emphasises immediate and 
intensive return of information between successive phases. This feedback mechanism, which 
can be thought of as local learning, is essentially based on a certain continuity of skills among 
different actors (scientist, engineer, technician and operator) and intensive human networks 
through which the tacit know-how is transferred. This human-network approach (Ito 1988) 
means that knowledge and information are more closely associated with the complex social 
relationships and work groups in which engineers/scientists operate. They are context defined, 
idiosyncratic and not immediately transferable outside, corresponding exactly to what Aoki 
terms specific collective assets (Aoki 1988). This type of asset cannot necessarily be divided 
into individual property, as the human capital theory supposes. Moreover, it can only be 
mobilised by an adequate incentive mechanism which puts the accent not on individual 
performance but on the collective commitment of members. As noted above, this mechanism 
is, more generally, sustained by the practice of long-term employment and the mode of career 
formation, which generate both long-term competition around internal promotions and 
cooperation based on shared values.  
The human network is obviously one of the elements which facilitates coordination 
within the French firm as well. But the same concept does not necessarily cover the same 
reality. In the case of France, the human network is considered more as a tool for a strategic 
power game: undisclosed or restricted information is a source of power in negotiations 
(Crozier 1973). Segmented by professional groups and weakened by a logic of "territory", the 
human network does not necessarily serve as a vehicle for disseminating knowledge within 
the French firm. In particular, tacit knowledge accumulated by technicians is seldom shared by 
engineers and remains latent or under-utilised. This is one of reasons that a short loop 
feedback in innovation cannot be fully mobilised in the French organisation. By contrast, 
engineers are likely to promote organisational learning on the basis of knowledge that is 
scientifically objectified, conceptualised or codified into formulas. To the extent that the talent 
of each engineer is fundamentally associated with the creation of generic concepts, 
 - 15 -   
competence and responsibility can be measured and evaluated on an individual basis. This 
type of incentive mechanism associated with the immediate career competition favours the 
diffusion of knowledge through mobility. The interfunctional rotation of engineers within the 
firm generates long-loop feedback effects on innovation, and their mobility in the labour 
market helps to spread the inter-firm human networks and diffuse new ideas and knowledge at 
sector or national level.  
 
III. Innovation Patterns  
 
The French engineer/scientist develops scientific and managerial skills around his or 
her territory. Such a building up of capabilities based on highly professional expertise 
encourages inventiveness. With its potential for originality, the possibility of a "breakthrough 
innovation", it can lead to occasional scientific success or even a far-reaching "feat", 
particularly when the State acts as challenge coordinator. This phenomenon is noticeable in 
certain sectors such as software system-integration, or the nuclear, aeronautics, or 
telecommunications industries, where the technocracy composed of "State engineers" (corps 
d'Etat) coordinates a “mission-orientated” policy, or in the chemical industry, where the 
scientific performance of research upstream of the production process determines its overall 
competitiveness. However, the fact that the engineers/scientists have a markedly different 
status from that of technicians or production workers tends to make the sharing of knowledge 
and/or know-how very difficult, thus calling the collective challenge into question. In France, 
original creativity appears to show itself in exceptional circumstances or through strong 
individual personalities, with its spin-offs often poorly capitalised upon or consolidated at the 
stage of industrialisation. In other words, organisational "routine" in French industry can be 
characterised both by great capability and high creativity at the top of the organisation and by 
the difficulty of its "translation" into manufacturing because of the discontinuity of skills 
between workers.  
In the case of Japan, engineers/scientists do not occupy a specific territory right from 
the start. Their skills and recognition as engineers are built up over time. In a position of 
apprenticeship, they train themselves by slowly exploring an area of competence collectively 
covered by the work group to which they belong. Learning is based essentially on the process 
of interacting with colleagues or more experienced engineers/scientists. Their contribution to 
the group consists of gradually enriching the current stock of knowledge/know-how. This 
form of collective learning within the organisation generates the same type of R&D staff 
having less differentiated cognitive resources and consequently impedes the emergence of 
individual originality (Sakakibara 1993). The meaning of industrial creativity is thus very 
different from the French sense: creativity is seen less as the creation of the new than as the 
consolidation/recombination of existing elements. In this way, the Japanese 
engineers/scientists tend to develop a very contextual or tacit competence which incorporates 
two industrial realities. The first concerns the need to combine formalised knowledge with 
empirical know-how in order to build up R&D efficiency in industry. The second refers to the 
necessity of creating a complementarity with other categories of actors such as supervisors 
and operators which goes as far as the distribution of shared knowledge or the overlapping of 
skills. It is doubtless not by chance that these practices contribute to shaping the Japanese 
form of "incremental innovation" which efficiently ensures the transition from applied 
research to design to prototype and on to industrialisation. This type of organisational 
"routine" appears particularly adapted to such assembly industries as mechanics and 
electronics which require "productive intelligence" from the shop floor. Nonetheless, such 
competence has rarely demonstrated its ability in other sectors (software, aeronautics, 
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pharmaceutical, biotechnology etc.) where creativity is more closely and directly linked to 
basic research activities or to individual capacity.ix The engineering culture based on genba 
shugi--the empirical approach to learning--evidently faces certain organisational challenges if 
it is to go beyond the known or generate a change of technological paradigms. This 
shortcoming is, however, being taken more and more seriously at a time when a move back to 
basic science is becoming a major challenge in industry. 
 
* 
This type of international comparison serves to bring out the interdependencies 
between the socialisation of actors, the mode of learning, the form of competence and the 
nature of innovation, thus demonstrating that the innovation process is deeply embedded in 
the societal (and national) context. Both France and Japan have a huge potentiality of 
cognitive resources which can create a variety of knowledge, but each country has developed 
a particular configuration of national institutions which tends to shape certain forms of the 
knowledge-creation process through, among other things, the training of engineers/scientists 
and their utilisation. This institutional environment functions as a given vis-à-vis the actors 
and constitutes a "path dependency" the national level. Institutional change is not at all 
impossible but may be gradual and adaptative, as is indicated by the evolutionary school. As 
for national economic competitiveness, the comparative advantage of each country ultimately 
seems to be based on a matching between the industrial/technological requisites of its sectors 
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In this Franco-Japanese comparative research, our method was based on qualitative case studies 
which permitted us de compare three couples of firms in the chemical, the electric/electronic and 
software service sectors. The firm chosen in our case study corresponds to national leading company 
in each sector, but its representativity in a statistical term is not guaranteed. Data were gathered by 
semi-directive interviews (2-3 hours) with managers and technical staff in R&D labs, business units 
and factories.  
Interview sample 
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Firm Characteristics Number of interviews 
1  Chemical-F Nationalised leading company (10000 employees of 
witch 50 % are technical staff); petro and fine 
chemicals 





Private leading company (8100 employees of which 
49% are technical staff); electricity distribution and 
transportation equipment,  Automatic controller   
21(5 managers and 16 
staff) 
3  Software-F Private independent company (3500 employees); 
software applications, system integration 
11 (3 managers and 8 
staff) 
4  Chemical-Jp Zaibatsu affiliated and leading company (9600 
employees of which 41 % are technical staff); 
general chemistry 





Private leading company  (12000 employees of 
witch 42 % are technical staff); industrial 
equipment, semiconductors etc. 
12 (5 managers and 7 
staff) 
6  Software-Jp Private independent company (1400 employees); 
software applications, telecom services 
  9 (4 managers and 5 
staff) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
